Dalhousie Law Journal
Volume 12
Issue 3 12:3 (1989-1990) Special Issue:
Commissions of Inquiry

Article 12

1-1-1990

The Two Contradictions in Public Inquiries
Liora Salter
Simon Fraser University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Liora Salter, "The Two Contradictions in Public Inquiries" (1990) 12:3 Dal LJ 173.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

11
The Two Contradictions

in Public Inquiries
Liora Salter*
1.

INTRODUCTION

Given how frequently they are commissioned, it is surprising how little
has been written about inquiries and, more particularly, about the role of
science and advocacy within them.' The lack of serious attention paid to
inquiries may be a product of their diversity. For example, inquiries include
royal commissions and consultative committees and risk assessments. Some
of these inquiries have wide-ranging mandates, commission extensive
research and actively solicit public commentary, while others are more closely
akin to legal proceedings. Grouping such different objectives and activities
under a single category - namely, inquiries - is intrinsically difficult. Or the
reason for the lack of attention paid to inquiries may simply be that the political issues raised by specific inquiries seem more important to commentators
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than the discussion of how politics is conducted through them. The situation is
inexcusable, whatever its origin, for inquiries play a pivitol role in the delineation of public issues and public debate, even when their recommendations
are not implemented.
In fact, the inquiry is a particularly complex and interesting phenomenon
in the political life of western democracies. It offers the public an unlimited
opportunity for experiencing direct democracy, that is, widespread political
participation in the formation of specific policies. It offers an opportunity to
define public issues, in the public view, with the participation of the clients of
those policies. It provides an avenue for a public investigation of public and
private conduct, far in excess of that conducted by the ombudsmen. At the
same time, of course, inquiries provide governments with the opportunity to
delay, obfuscate and defuse political controversy, and with advice that they
are free to ignore.
None of these characteristics is particularly noteworthy; none more than
conventional wisdom about politics. There are, however, two aspects of
inquiries worthy of more discussion, two quite fundamental contradictions in
the inquiry process that are much less understood. The first lies in the almost
unprecedented opportunity provided by inquiries to expand the discussion of
public issues. The inquiry can, as the Berger inquiry did, 2 gather information
from those directly affected by particular policies, including those who have
no experience with political participation. It can also consider a range of
proposals as broad as measures to restructure the economy or government. In
other words, an inquiry operates almost without boundaries with respect to the
information it can receive and the proposals it can consider. At the same time,
inquiries are mandated by and report to government. Perhaps more than any
other advisory body, their members are focussed on the task of persuasion and
the need to create recommendations that are agreeable, or at least feasible, to
those who will receive them. The first contradiction, then, lies in the potential
of inquiries to incorporate radical debate while maintaining an orientation to
the very limited and pragmatic policy goals.
The second contradiction is best captured in an offhand statement by a
high profile criminal lawyer who has recently acted for clients in a variety of
different inquiries. He noted that inquiries offer the opportunity "to put the
state on trial" and, continuing with the same thought, he suggested that
inquiries are "a trial in which no one goes to jail". Even the most limited
"fact-finding" inquiries often examine how government procedures are put
into operation and who is actually responsible for the consequences of public
policies or actions. Government officials, departmental spokespeople,
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members of parliament and others, who themselves are not "on trial" can be
brought before an inquiry and asked to account for their actions. Moreover,
the structure of decision-making within which they function can also be introduced as pertinent evidence.
At the same time, inquiries are "trials" in a conventional sense, although
this fact is often not recognized or acknowledged. Inquiries almost always
deal with the issue of wrongdoing, either in terms of something that has
happened or in terms of the potential of harm if a course of action is followed.
Also they almost always deal with the question of who is or should be held
responsible for the consequences of such "wrongdoing", even when the damages being assessed have yet to occur. Corporate, and even government participants, know this and plan their participation accordingly -to protect
themselves from the legal consequences of their actions. As such, they function as if they were already facing a court of law, even in informal inquiries
with policy mandates.
In other words, the second contradiction in the inquiry process lies in its
ambiguous relationship with the legal process. Inquiries are, at once, freed
from the constraints of legal proceedings to conduct their investigations in as
wide-ranging and open a manner as their commissioners deem advisable. At
the same time, inquiries are legal proceedings and at least some of their participants act accordingly.
The title of this paper refers to science and advocacy. Science, in this
instance, means both scientists and the type of information they generate for
use in an inquiry. Advocacy refers to both the participants and to the
recommendations they make in inquiries. The basic contention of this paper is
that the characteristics of inquiries have a profound influence on science and
advocacy. Indeed, it is suggested, if there are new insights to be found in the
experience of scientists and advocates, it is in how such groups situate
themselves to deal with the two contradictions in the inquiry process described briefly above.
An inquiry is any body that is formally mandated by a government,
either on an ad hoc basis or with reference to a specific problem, to conduct a
process of fact-finding and to arrive at a body of recommendations. There are
four elements to this definition that serve to limit the kinds of committee
deliberations that are included in a study of inquiries.
First, this definition places emphasis on the existence of a formal mandate. Inquiries can be distinguished from most task forces and committees
because their tasks, powers and responsibilities are spelled out formally in
advance of their operations. Second, this definition limits the study of
inquiries to those bodies which have specific tasks which, once completed,
require the dissolution of the inquiry or its reassignment. In other words,
inquiries have limited and task-related life cycles which are given in their
mandates and are related to the particular jobs to be undertaken.
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The third element of this definition takes issue with a commonly used
method of distinguishing between inquiries - namely, fact-finding and policy
inquiries - and places emphaisis on the exceptional wide scope of investigation that can be undertaken by inquiries and commissions. I would argue that
inquiries - all inquiries - are mandated to conduct processes of fact-finding
and to arrive at recommendations. In almost every instance, I suggest, such
recommendations contain measures addressed to the broad questions of public
policy. Obviously, inquiries differ as to the degree to which either fact-finding
or achieving policy consensus is pursued and they probably can be arranged
on a continuum with respect to the emphasis given to each aspect of their
work. Nonetheless, both activities are always pursued to some extent and
neither should be neglected in the examination of inquiries.
Finally, the definition emphasizes the recommendations produced by
inquiries as central aspects of their activities. In the final analysis, regardless
of the research generated by an inquiry or the policy consensus shaped among
its participants, any inquiry must produce a list of recommendations to the
government that commissioned it. This requirement - imperative might be a
better term - shapes and constrains the research, the response to submissions, the discussion within the inquiry among its staff and commissioners
and the scope of its assessment of alternative policies. Even if the recommendations of inquiries are ignored, the pressure to create them is a critical
component within the inquiry process.
The inquiries used for the analysis include the six discussed extensively
in Public Inquiries in Canada,3 the Federal Consultative Committee on IBT
Pesticides, of which I was a member' and the special inquiries of the
Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission on a variety
of matters related to broadcasting policy. In addition, I have done research for
the Royal Commission on Uranium Mining in British Columbia, the Porter
Commission on Electric Power Planning in Ontario, the West Coast Oil Ports
Inquiry, the MacDonald Commission and the Task Force on Broadcasting. In
the case of the MacDonald Commission, I participated in evaluating its legal
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research. I have also conducted a lengthy series of interviews with inquiry
participants in conjunction with a study on standard setting, discussed in the
book Mandated Science, and I will make reference to the Berger Inquiry
because it has been discussed so frequently in the press. None of these
inquiries deals with cases of individual wrongdoing, but all were "factfinding" as well as policy-making in orientation.
2.

THE FIRST CONTRADICTION: RADICAL AND REFORMIST
DIMENSIONS OF INQUIRIES

The first contradiction of the inquiry process lies in the capacity of
inquiries to incorporate quite radical debate, while oriented to the quite limited, highly pragmatic and, indeed, reformist goal of producing specific
recommendations for policy. The reformist nature of inquiries is easiest to
demonstrate. In a commentary on the MacDonald Commission, Richard
Simeon provides a rare insight into the pragmatic and reformist nature of the
inquiry process.5
Simeon acknowledges that the MacDonald Commission's "logic ... is
consistently market-based and explicitly rejects not only the muddle and
inconsistency of the industrial policies of the sixties and seventies, but also
the proposals for a more activitist industrial policy, such as those advocated
by the Science Council". 6 He provides a number of reasons why this should
be so. First, he notes that the organization of the MacDonald Commission,
into sections and by disciplinary specialization, became "tyrannical" in the
later stages of the inquiry, and that "(o)nly a tiny coterie of senior commission
officials,. . . and some of the Commissioners themselves, had a grasp of the
whole."' Acting under extreme time pressure, those working within the
Commission had trouble seeing the forest for the trees in a process he
describes as "complex and messy".
Second, Simeon notes that commissions are bound by conventional wisdom and the political pressures under which they operate (in the case of the
MacDonald Commission, also by the election of a new government). Third,
he suggests that commissions rely upon disciplinary norms to locate their
researchers and are thus likely to reflect the prevailing paradigms in those
disciplines. In the case of the MacDonald Commission, this meant that neoclassical economists, who are currently regarded as the "best" within their
discipline, were likely to be chosen as its economic researchers and that their

5
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willingness to include frankly prescriptive comments in their research studies
was neither unusual nor unacceptable. It also meant that given the organization of the research by discipline - economics, political science and law,
specifically - research problems not addressed by the chosen disciplines are
likely to be ignored. Simeon cites the example of the MacDonald Commission's neglect of studies of technology. Fourth, Simeon notes that those who
write different sections of the report view those sections as their "property"
and are thus disinclined to seek out interdisciplinary work.
Simeon argues that these and other structural constraints in the way
inquiries are organized results in their fundamentally reformist orientation. As
he states:
[Ilt should occasion no surprise that the Macdonald Commission did not propose
a fundamental, radical reorientation of Canadian society and economy. Royal
Commissions are appointed by governments in power. By their very nature, they
can be no more than meliorative and reformist, rather than revolutionary.
Members are representatives of established elites. Commissioners are also creatures of their times; perhaps the best that can be expected is that they collect, and
then express, a shifting conventional wisdom, tilting it in one direction or other
way but working well within the bounds of the existing order.8
In this conclusion, Simeon is perhaps mistaken. To understand the radical dimension of inquiries, or at least their potential for radicalism, it is useful
to examine the Berger inquiry which took a very different direction from that
of the MacDonald Commission. 9 The Berger inquiry's radicalism was of a
particular type, of course. The Berger inquiry did not provide a blueprint for
revolution or democratic socialism nor did it encompass issues concerned
with class or the economy. Yet, the Berger inquiry was radical in the sense of
redefining its task to encompass the aspirations of indigenous people and in its
attention to democratic participation. It was radical in as much as it shifted the
government's agenda from the immediate problem of which pipeline to
approve, or what measures to take to ameliorate environmental damage, to
much broader social issues.
According to its original mandate, the Berger inquiry dealt with two
proposals to construct a gas pipeline through the MacKenzie Valley. Anyone
who has read its final report, released in 1977 after extensive public hearings
in native communities, knows that the Berger inquiry in fact addressed the
problem of native sovereignty as its primary concern and that it incorporated
not only the insights of academics and policy-makers, but those of the actual
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population affected by a decision about the pipeline. In other words, by its
procedures and in its handling of issues, the Berger inquiry made explicit the
potential of an inquiry as a locus of radical debate.
How did it do this? First, the Berger inquiry dealt explicitly with
questions about the necessity and desirability of constructing the pipeline,
seen from both a technical and a broad policy perspective. Using "necessity
and desirability" as the focus of its investigation, the Berger inquiry was able
to widen its investigation to include matters of economic planning and social
development related, only indirectly, to the potential damage constructing a
pipeline might cause. Second, the Berger inquiry was among the first to
provide funding for its public intervenors, thus encouraging a new level and
kind of participation in the public formation process.
Third, the Berger inquiry gave great credence to experiential data from
those most likely to be affected by any pipeline or government action. The
report argued that the submissions by Indian elders should be viewed as evidence and treated with as much credibility as the submissions by expert
witnesses. The inquiry set out to gather the experiential data in a systematic
manner by educating potential participants about the questions to be addressed
in their submissions and about the procedures of the inquiry and by visiting
each community within the region. Fourth, the Berger inquiry not only
commissioned research, but required its own staff to make formal public
submissions to the inqiury to discuss their recommendations on the basis of it.
Indeed, all of the research submitted to the inquiry was subject to crossexamination, a process that some commentators have compared favourably
with the conventional academic peer review process."0
Fifth, Berger understood that inquiries can be used by their participants
for different purposes and that this might be desirable. The briefs addressed to
the inquiry, and designed to fashion its recommendations, were also
addressed to a wider public made available through media coverage of the
inquiry. At the same time, participants also used the inquiry as a forum to
address their own constituencies. In this last task, representatives of political
organizations, and expert witnesses hired by them, were able to take the
diverse and often diffuse comments from the members of their constituencies
and shape them into coherent presentations. In other words, the inquiry provided
an opportunity to fashion political analysis and programs out of the otherwise
raw material of public opinion and individual experience. The Berger inquiry
recognized the importance of this process of developing consciousness and of
its articulation and it afforded its participants many opportunities to "come
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into their own" as advocate groups through the process of speaking to the
inquiry.
Finally, Berger, his staff and many of the inquiry's participants
recognized the importance of language in the creation of political issues and
their resolution. The original inquiry had been cast as a debate about the
merits of two applications. Inquiries dealing with similar problems, including
some modelled intentionally after the Berger inquiry, often focus their attention on a discussion of "development", as Berger might have done." Such
inquiries have spoken mainly about the "social impacts of development",
about how to handle the negative consequences of corporate activity. In its
final report, the Berger inquiry relegated both "development" and its "social
impacts" to secondary importance. For Berger, the critical debate was quite a
different one.
Berger recognized what is often implicitly understood about inquiries.
He recognized that the description of issues adopted by an inquiry foretells the
types of proposals that will be evaluated in response to them. Berger used the
public submissions to fashion a language that was amenable to the kind of
recommendations he was preparing to make. He drew out of submissions the
language necessary to describe his mandate so that he could support his
recommendations relating to native land claims.
Indeed, although Simeon does not acknowledge the potentially radical
aspects of inquiries, he makes the same point about the MacDonald Commission, although in this case, to explain why the Commission was unable to
work comfortably with material falling outside the paradigm of neo-classical
economics. Simeon notes that the Commissioners "were seized with a sense
of urgency", and that they felt a sense of "threat" that the current policies
would no longer suffice in the increasingly competitive world environment.
As Simeon states, "[t]hese realities combined to create a sense that something
major had to be done", and that something "must be new and dramatic". The
"crisis", Simeon notes, was understood to be primarily an economic one and
thus submissions focussed on the need for greater equality, social justice,
attention to the weak and marginalized were seen to be beside the point since
they did not address the problems of economic growth and efficiency. As
Simeon states:
Once the terrain for debate on industrial policy was defined as growth and
productivity, the social or ethical dimensions of industrial policy were largely
irrelevant: policy must be "development-oriented" rather than "distribution
oriented". Moreover, the critique of interventionist industrial strategies mounted
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by the economists . . . was highly persuasive. Given this starting position, to
argue for such policies was to argue for a discredited past.' 2

The cases of the MacDonald Commission and the Berger inquiry are
different, of course. In the MacDonald Commission, the description of a
"crisis" served to limit the range of proposals that would be taken seriously,
while in Berger's case, the new description of the problem, generated through
the inquiry, permitted it to go beyond the limitations of its original mandate.
That said, the point is an important one, for in each case the struggle over how
to define the problem to be addressed by the inquiry was the most important
moment in its deliberations.
The point of raising the example of the Berger inquiry is not to evaluate it
nor to draw upon the critiques that have since appeared in the literature. What
the Berger inquiry did was present in bold relief the characteristics of an
inquiry that make it amenable to radical debate. Indeed, from the Berger
inquiry, both government and members of the public learned that an inquiry
could be an exceptionally public process. They learned that an inquiry could
be used to solicit new kinds of public participation in public life and to debate
issues in greater detail than is possible in parliament, within government or in
the normal course of media coverage. They learned that an inquiry can be
used as a means of crystalizing public opinion into well-articulated positions
from which a policy consensus could be developed. The Berger inquiry illustrated how the language used, in the mandate or by the Commissioners,
could expand or delimit the problem to be addressed. For quite different
reasons, these aspects of the inquiry process appeal to governments, advocate
groups and even industry, irrespective of the radical debate and proposals they
also generated in the case of the Berger inquiry.
The point of the comparison between the Berger and MacDonald
inquiries is not to argue that one was good and the other not or to belabour the
obvious point that Tom Berger and Donald MacDonald had different politics
and priorities. It is instead to use the MacDonald Commission to illustrate one
side of inquiries and the pressure that is put upon their commissioners to arrive at a series of reformist recommendations. And it is to use the Berger
inquiry to illustrate how far an inquiry can go to encorporate radical debate
and genuinely democratic participation.
What are we to make of the contradiction that the comparison of the two
inquiries illustrates? What are we to make of the fundamentally reformist nature of inquiries and their capacity to incorporate radical alternatives and debate? It goes almost without saying that inquiries send out mixed messages.
To the public, inquiries offer the possibility of a discussion about public
policy that knows few limits in terms of its participants, the information it can
12

Supra, note 6 at 175.

182 COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY

gather or the proposals it can entertain. This is not a false promise, although
many inquiries fail to deliver upon it.
At the same time, even the Berger inquiry ran up against the reformist
limitations of inquiries, primarily through the process of shaping its
recommendations in a manner that would be acceptable to government. To the
extent that an inquiry promises the opportunity for radical debate - as the
MacDonald Commission did, in fact 3 - but produces a report that displays
little sensitivity to the submissions it has received, the response is likely to be
a cynical or angry one. And if inquiries are commissioned, in part, to defuse
controversy, such inquiries succeed only in fueling it further.
The experience of the Berger and MacDonald inquiries also helps us
redefine the purpose of reformist-radical debate within them. In these quite
different inquiries, the primary struggle was over how to define and understand the problem to be addressed. It was a struggle over language because the
description of the "crisis" in each case would predetermine the acceptability
of proposals to respond to it. This is an important insight. Too frequently
inquiries have been faulted because their specific recommendations are not
accepted. We would do better if we understood that recommendations are
important primarily because the pressure to produce them exerts a powerful
control upon the commissioners and forces even the most radically inclined
inquiries to be pragmatic and reformist in the final analysis. And even if none
of their recommendations is accepted, inquiries are still important because
they are the locus, and one of the very few occasions, for a public debate
about the definition of public issues, including a debate about reformist and
radical conceptions of these issues. Inquiries prepare the ground for public
sentiment and policies, even if they themselves do not propose policies that
governments accept.
We can return now to Simeon's contention that inquiries are fundamentally reformist in nature. I have argued that Simeon's conclusion is premature
and that inquiries do, or can, have the potential to incorporate a radical debate. That said, the Berger inquiry is an exceptional one and, in general,
Simeon is accurate in his perception. What is necessary to complement his
analysis, and to take account of the exceptions, is a further analysis of why,
given their radical potential, inquiries so seldom reach beyond the narrow
limits of pragmatic politics.
For this purpose, it is useful to note that inquiries, even the Berger
inquiry, have both a public and a private process. Through their hearings and
their contracted research, inquiries reach out into the public for fresh insights,
information and possible proposals of action. When this public survey and de-
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bate is concluded, however, the inquiry staff and commissioners retreat to
consider the material and to write their final report. Once in retreat, their
activities are private ones. Several consequences follow from the private
aspects of the inquiry process.
First, as Simeon notes, and I have discussed at length elsewhere,' 4 the
private component of the inquiry process resembles a negotiation more than
an assessment. It is conducted under extreme time pressures so that no one
involved has time to absorb, let alone integrate, the vast body of information
and the significance of seemingly insignificant revisions from one draft of the
final report to the next.
Second, in these private negotiations of the inquiry process, another
"party" joins the table. The government to whom the final report is addressed
becomes a silent member of the negotiating team. A great deal of the argument discussed among the staff and commissioners is addressed to this silent
player as each person casts his or her arguments as "what the government will
want to hear" or "what the government will buy". But since the government is
not present, except "in spirit", no checks or balances are inserted into the
discussion. The appeal to the "silent partner" serves to limit and constrain
what the inquiry report will contain and the scope of the recommendations it
will make. It creates the classic situation of self-censorship.
Third, in these negotiations, something happens to the public submissions and research that is neither intended nor particularly desired. Because so
few people in fact write the report and because their deliberations occur under
extreme time pressures and in closed-door situations, material from the
submissions, and often from the research studies as well, is lifted out of
context and used strategically to advance particular arguments. Words or
phrases from the submissions become disconnected from the analysis in
which they are generated. They are disassociated from the submission as a
whole, either a public submission or a research report, and used simply to
support positions in the negotiation.
Finally, because the report-writing activities of an inquiry are conducted
in private and because neither commissioners nor staff are genuinely
representative of particular interests or constituencies, the capacity of any
individual to negotiate for a particular objective is diminished considerably.
The point is best made by example. As a member of the Federal Consultative
Committee on IBT Pesticides, I saw my own role as ensuring that the
commission took into account the actual conditions under which these pesticides were being used. This meant that I was particularly sensitive to the type of
information brought forward by treeplanters and farm workers, for these
groups were the most likely to be exposed to danger. Although I was in no

14
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sense a representative of these groups, I undertook to represent their experience in the internal negotiations of the inquiry.
Two factors hampered my efforts. First, because I had been appointed as
an expert rather than as a representative, I also felt it was incumbent upon me
to consider other aspects of the problem, including, for example, the
problems that farmers might have if the pesticide were banned. I had, in other
words, to become a generalist while at the same time maintaining an interest
in a particular constituency and their problems. This was difficult to do and I
suspect that many people in my position choose one side or the other of the
dilemma with the result that their contribution as either a representative or as a
generalist is compromised.
More serious perhaps, I was engaged in a process of negotiation - I
called it "horsetrading" - in which a great deal of "give and take" was necessary if the final report was to be written. As a result of these negotiations, the
final reports of inquiries often contain seemingly contradictory recommendations. Ours was no exception. On one hand, the report claimed that studies
had not demonstrated dangers to humans while, on the other, it recommended
that farm fields should be posted with warnings about the pesticide spraying.
In the context of negotiations, it is never possible to win all the issues.
Decisions often have to be made about the importance of particular
recommendations and about whether they could be "traded" for someone
else's important items.
The situation I was placed in can be compared to a labour negotiation,
but there is an important difference between labour negotiations and the
negotiations that characterize the report-writing stage of an inquiry. In an
inquiry, those who are negotiating are neither accountable nor in a position to
discuss the possible "trade offs" with those to whom they are of most serious
concern. I could not have known, and I still do not know for example,
whether my insistence upon a recommendation that farm fields be posted with
notices about pesticide spraying (incidentally, a recommendation that was not
accepted by the government) was more important than the recommendations I
gave up in order to secure its place in the final report. I had no means to check
my perceptions or priorities and, in this, I was no different from the other
commissioners who were more prone than I to sympathize with the farmers or
the manufacturers.
For those who espouse a reformist politics and a notion of politics as
consensus building, seeing inquiries in terms of negotiations probably poses
few problems. For those who wish to emulate the Berger inquiry or to make
the inquiry a locus of a wide-ranging and, occasionally, radical debate, the
inclusion of the government as the "silent partner" to the negotiations, the
reduction of public submissions, considered analysis and research reports to a
few strategic phrases and the loss of accountability during the period when the.
recommendations are being negotiated renders even the most radical inquiries
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reformist at best, and profoundly undemocratic in the worst cases. If Simeon's
insights about inquiries are insufficiently dialectical, they are also correct for
the most part in the final analysis.
3.

THE SECOND CONTRADICTION: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGAL
STATUS OF INQUIRIES

The second contradiction in inquiries lies in their ambiguous relationship
with the legal process. Inquiries are both freed from the constraints of legal
proceedings and, at the same time, very much influenced by legal considerations. They can, in fact, be described as trials in disguise. I will deal with the
freedom of inquiries first.
An important reason why inquiries are commissioned is that they permit
investigation of problems in a more informal, less legalistic setting than the
courts. Quite often, even in the case of an investigation of individual misconduct, inquiries set their own rules of procedure. They can design procedures
appropriate to the kind of information and participation they seek. Thus, for
example, the Dubin inquiry will be different from the Sinclair Stevens
inquiry, and different again from the Ocean Ranger inquiry, even though each
of these inquiries focuses in part on an investigation of wrongdoing. These
inquiries are different, because their commissioners have taken different
approaches, but also because the information that they require cannot be fit
into a standard structure of investigation.
There are other examples. Berger's community hearings were quite
different from his own more formal sessions dealing with the submissions of
expert witnesses, yet neither was given more credence. In the LeDain Inquiry
into the Non-Medical Uses of Drugs and in Porter's Inquiry on Electric Power
Planning in Ontario, scientists made their submissions to other scientists in
sessions that resembled academic seminars rather than public hearings. The
advantage of their doing so is obvious.
Inquiries also usually operate with a much broader concept of "interested
party" than do the courts. Indeed, they must if such interests as the environment or such groups as the National Anti-Poverty Organization are to be
included. To the extent that theory underlies this particular aspect of an
inquiry, it is the contention that an interest group negotiation, conceived in
traditional terms, cannot represent those groups who lack an immediate,
personal and financial stake in the decision nor can it attract participation
representative of the public good, where few individuals are themselves
directly affected. As Emond notes, if environmental concerns are to be raised
in an inquiry, either the trees must have court-appointed lawyers (a dubious
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proposition at best) or the concept of an interested party must be enlarged to
include advocacy groups. 5
The final point to be made with respect to the freedom of inquiries from
the strictures of legal proceedings has been mentioned in the introduction to
this paper. A lawyer with experience in several high profile inquiries was quoted as saying that inquiries offer the opportunity to put "the state on trial" in a
situation where "nobody goes to jail". The importance of his observation
should be stressed. In most of the inquiries about "wrongdoing", the factors
that encourage "wrongdoing" are as important as the conduct of the individuals involved. For example, in the Sinclair Stevens inquiry, what was at
issue, surely, was not just the conduct of Sinclair Stevens but also the limitations of the conflict of interest guidelines in handling the actual relationships
and actions in which any cabinet minister was likely to be engaged. Similarly,
one can argue that the officers of companies that pollute should be held individually responsible. If, however, no one at the inquiry also addresses the
organization practices that lead to pollution, the financial rewards that follow
from it and the regulatory regime that monitors the offence, the problem will
not be resolved by the imprisonment of a few people.
Putting the "state on trial" includes examining all of these factors: the
organizational practices of companies and governments, the financial incentives for wrongdoing, the regulatory regime that is supposed to monitor
conduct and its mechanisms of enforcement. It includes examining the
relationships between government contracting, departmental decisions and
corporate lobbying that underlay Sinclair Stevens' actions. It also includes, or
should include, examining the patterns of development that render native
people marginal even on their own land, the historical factors that lead to high
unemployment rates in Newfoundland and the investment policies that resulted eventually in the Ocean Ranger disaster.
Inquiries encourage the discussion of broad issues among the public at
large. There are few other opportunities to address these broader questions.
By virtue of their freedom to define "interested party" widely, to adopted
innovative procedures for investigation and to render recommendations that
do not necessarily impinge upon the legal rights of individuals, inquiries are
also unique and important in policy formation. To create the maximum opportunity for addressing issues of state and governance, however, inquiries need
to be freed from the strictures of the legal process. And so they are in most
instances.
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But the situation of inquiries cannot be described adequately only by
reference to the wide-ranging investigations they sometimes conduct. If
inquiries are freed from the strictures of the legal process, they are also legal
proceedings. In fact, I would argue that inquiries are themselves "trials" and
that their legal substratum shapes
both their participation and their capacity to
16
inform and to stimulate debate.
To support this second argument, it is instructive to look at a new source
of inquiries - the risk assessment process that has been made part of the
evaluation of some pesticides. The first such risk assessment - it was not
called a risk assessment at the time - was probably the Federal Consultative
Committee on IBT Pesticides. Like the advocate groups, I came to the
hearings with a strong belief in the importance of public hearings and faith in
the process of cross-examination as a means of arriving at "the facts of the
case".
As a member, I made a number of observations, all of which underline
the implicit legal content of inquiries. First, I observed that the legal definition of interested party had much more bearing on the course of the inquiry
than was acknowledged. Although a variety of interest and advocacy groups
had standing in the hearings, it seemed to me, as a commissioner, that their
submissions were not viewed as equally credible. It was not the case, as might
be supposed, that those who sought to have the pesticide banned lacked credibility. Rather, at least informally among the commissioners, only those with a
direct, pecuniary interest were taken very seriously. Thus the farmworkers,
whose brief was couched mainly in examples and rhetoric, were credible as
were the treeplanters, farmers and pesticide manufacturers. But the environmental advocate groups, whose well-researched briefs left little to be desired,
were not. In other words, the importance of having a pecuniary and/or legal
interest in the final recommendations of the inquiry should not be underestimated.
Second, I observed that much of the inquiry centered on an investigation
of who had legal jurisdiction and responsibility for ensuring safety, rather than
on the safety of the pesticide under discussion. This too is more similar to a
court than a supposedly free-wheeling inquiry. Moreover, the investigation of
responsibility was largely confined to government officials who took the
opportunity to delineate in the most formalistic manner their official
mandates. From these submissions, I could identify who did not have a formal
mandate and responsibility for aspects of pesticide approval. It was considerably less clear where responsibility for the decisions actually rested. In fact, I
concluded, at the time, that the inquiry, and indeed each assessment of a
controversial pesticide, provided the opportunity to negotiate relationships
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among various government departments, each of which sought jurisdiction
but no final legal responsibility. In other words, my hoped-for situation of
putting the state on trial still lacked an "accused" at the conclusion of the
inquiry because all of the parties sought to avoid being "accused" in the same
manner as they would have done in a court.
Third, at least some of the parties engaged in activities that were more
compatible with a trial than a free-wheeling inquiry. The companies, which
might in other circumstances be facing court action as a result of any harm
caused by the pesticide, viewed their participation strategically and left little
to chance. As well as having counsel present, they did everything they could
to fashion a strong defence, although technically speaking, none was required
in this inquiry. For example, I observed that the pesticide manufacturers had
stationed a woman in the library of the inquiry, whose task involved explaining what was occurring to anyone who used the facility, particularly the
media. Moreover, the companies couched their presentation not as part of an
investigation of the risks nor as a debate about the scientific merit of particular
studies, but as a defence of their product and, more importantly, as a defence
of their activities.
Fourth, the legal substructure of inquiries became particularly obvious
with respect to the labels on pesticides. It seemed to me, as a consumer in this
instance, that the label was singularly uninformative. On one hand, the label
seemed to suggest that no dangers had been identified with the product in
question, but, on the other hand, the label recommended quite specific
precautionary measures. I pursued a line of questioning in the inquiry which
went as follows: If the company had no serious concerns about the risks posed
by the pesticide, why did it recommend such extensive precautionary
measures? And if the precautionary measures were essential to the labelling of
the product, might one not also conclude that some question existed about its
serious risks? I got nowhere with this line of questioning and, in retrospect, I
determined that the cause of my frustration was the significance of the label
for legal purposes. I had naively expected that everyone, including the
company, sought the most informative label possible, not recognizing that a
label is a legal document affecting the determination of negligence and
liability. The companies were not so naive.
Fifth, the most recent risk assessment - the first formal risk assessment
of its kind in Canada - into the regulatory status of a pesticide concerned the
pesticide alachlor. The alachlor case confirms my original observations.
Although its purpose was to conduct as wide-ranging investigation as was
necessary, this risk assessment resembled a court. This was true even though
the board conducting the inquiry was quite sympathetic to health and environmental issues and the environmental groups were funded. On "trial" in this
instance was a pesticide that had been in use for many years. The scientific
evidence was conflicting. The impact of a decision to ban the chemical might
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protect the health of many; the effect of banning it would definitely impinge
upon the livelihood of a clearly identifiable group of farmers, not to mention
manufacturers.
The outcome of this last inquiry - a recommendation from the inquiry
to permit the pesticide to be used - was never in doubt. For to the extent that
the inquiry was a trial in disguise, it was impossible to prove conclusively that
the danger existed or that such a danger would outweigh the very real consequences to individuals that a ban would impose. In other words, by the
standards used in a court, the pesticide could not reasonably be found "guilty"
of being dangerous, even if some studies suggested that it might cause harm.
Furthermore, after this inquiry filed its report, it was faced with a lawsuit
from the company manufacturing an alternative chemical, arguing that the
evidence about the alternative chemical was "inadmissible" and that certain
rights had been infringed by the inquiry's investigations. Even though the
appeal was denied, this too is further evidence that the companies have treated
the inquiry as if it were a legal proceeding.
Almost all inquiries, I would argue, deal with the question of
"wrongdoing" and with issues concerning negligence and liability. Inquiries
are always "trials" in some sense of the word. In the case of the Sinclair
Stevens inquiry, the wrongdoing had already occurred and all participants
were cognizant of the need to mount legal defences of their positions. In the
Ocean Ranger case, it was necessary to identify the proper "accused" and part
of the investigation of the inquiry was focussed upon the issue of where, if
anywhere, blame should fall. In these instances, the legal substratum of
inquiries is, or at least should be, apparent to all.
Let us return to the example of the Berger inquiry and to similar inquiries
that are designed to identify the risks, costs and benefits of a proposed activity
such as a pipeline, dam or program of electricity generation. Obviously, in
these inquiries, there can be no "accused" in the sense that neither the action
nor its possible negative consequences has occurred yet. At the same time, the
potentially dangerous aspects of the proposed activity are usually being investigated. These inquiries seek to determine, in advance, not only what might
happen, but the costs that would be incurred as a result of any damage and the
locus of legal responsibility both for the supervision of the activity and for its
consequences. In other words, such inquiries are similar to trials even if no act
of wrongdoing has occurred because the questions to be addressed are the
same as those that would, and will, be addressed if problems arise, if there is
"negligence" and if someone is to be held liable for it. Indeed, such inquiries
and the submissions made to them often can be made relevant later in a formal
court proceeding.
The inquiries concerned with the re-evaluation of pesticides fall
somewhere in between inquiries like the Ocean Ranger case and the Berger or
Porter Commissions. On one hand, they deal with damages, negligence and

190 COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY

liability that have yet to occur, in as much as they focus on the future regulatory status of pesticides. On the other hand, they put information onto the
public record about the past practices of the manufacturers and government
with respect to their handling of the risks already posed by the pesticide.
These too are "trials" and their participants conduct themselves accordingly.
What about inquiries, such as the MacDonald Commission, whose tasks
are confined to making policy recommendations? Are they also legal
proceedings? One could stretch the analysis and suggest that it was Keynesian
policies that were on "trial" in the MacDonald Commission, but that would be
to miss the point of the argument. Instead, it is useful to return to Simeon's
description. In discussing the role of. business interests in the inquiry, he
states:
While at a very high level of generality it might be said that a "business" ideology was presented to the Commissioners, the chief impression is of how vague,
undefined and unspecific the business briefs to the Commission were... There
was precious little guidance for policy in these briefs, and indeed, many important business interests either failed to participate or did so in the most proforma
way - and then only when prodded. Commissioners were often scathing in
their criticism of the shallowness and predictability of the business contributions."7
The MacDonald Commission can probably not be described as a trial in
disguise in as much as no particular actions - past or yet to occur - of business or government were subjects of discussion. At the same time and probably for just this reason, the level of involvement of the key players in the policy
debate about the economy was minimal if Simeon's description is accurate.
Business was absent, in body or in spirit, because the inquiry was not a trial
and because its presence in this particular forum was not required.
The second contradiction in the inquiry process, then, concerns the
ambiguous status of an inquiry with respect to the legal process. The most
useful aspects of an inquiry stem from its capacity to investigate problems in a
manner that is appropriate to the problem, the participants and the type of
information being sought. To succeed, inquiries cannot become court-like in
their approach, for if they do, and if they fail to protect the rights of the
"accused", they constitute a trial in which legal protections are absent. If they
become court-like, they fail "to put the state on trial" and to locate the structural or systemic aspects of such problems as corruption, pollution, industrial
accident or the diffusion of toxic substances.
Even the Berger or Porter inquiries were more similar to trials than Berger or Porter would acknowledge. For at least some of the participants, the
issues were related to potential damages, negligence and liability. For these

17

Supra, note 6 at 170.

THE TWO CONTRADICTIONS IN PUBLIC INQUIRIES

191

participants, at least, the only prudent course was to act as if the inquiry was a
court and its deliberations directly transferable to legal proceedings, even if
technically speaking, neither supposition is correct.
4.

ADVOCACY AND SCIENCE IN INQUIRIES

Virtually everyone who appears before inquiries in their public hearings
is an advocate, in the sense of representing a point of view, even when the
primary orientation of the inquiry is fact-fincing. For, unlike the scientific
studies that public inquiries often seek to emulate, inquiries are usually passive with respect to generating their own participation. As a result, their participants come to the hearings not so much because of the important information they may impart, but more because they have a point of view they wish to
express. Indeed, one of the most challenging problems faced by commissioners is how to extract useful information from intervenors whose intention
is primarily to persuade.
The two contradictions of the inquiry process obviously affect advocacy.
In the case of the radical/reformist nature of the process, the contradiction
poses quite concrete problems for academics and those whose research is used
to support particular recommendations. The radical potential of inquiries
originates from the fact that they present an open field to their possible participants. Few, if any, constraints are imposed upon the public submissions and in
the example of the MacDonald Commission, some participants even used that
inquiry to advance an analysis of capitalism and a socialist vision.
Simeon's contention about the potential of inquiries for radical debate is
that it was naive to believe that such contributions would be taken seriously or
that they would not be transformed within the inquiry into something much
more reformist in orientation. He says:
Faced with a body like the Macdonald Commission, radical analysts are faced
with a dilemma. To argue that the problems are profoundly structural ... is also
to argue that they can only be solved by fundamental, sweeping change. More
limited reforms are by definition ineffective, so there is little incentive to explore
them. The problem with this approach.., is that it can end up as "defeatism
clothed in hope", generating proposals easily dismissed by the Commissioners
as extreme and ideological. On the other hand, to argue for incremental reforms
is, of course, to work within the logic of the existing order, and thus, from one
perspective, can be seen to be equally defeatist. 8
It is useful to look at the problem that Simeon identifies from a different
perspective. If it is seen as a reflection of the contradiction that bedevils all
inquiries, then the burden that falls upon academics as advocates is clear.
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What is demanded of such analysts is an approach which is simultaneously
analytical and broad-ranging and, at the same time, quite pragmatic and limited. In fact, Simeon would agree that some analysts in the MacDonald inquiry
were more successful than others in addressing the problem he describes.
Simeon lashes out primarily at the left-leaning advocates in the MacDonald
inquiry - or at least participants who reject neo-classical economic
approaches - for not having developed a workable alternative to the models
presented by the neo-classical economists and for lacking any new persuasive
programs of action. "The issue eventually comes down to 'you cannot fight
something with nothing"', he says. But he also says that the neo-classical
economists, who also espouse a radical critique, were prepared to offer a
program of action.
What Simeon's comments underline is the burden that is placed upon all
analysts making recommendations to inquiries to come up with both a new
language to describe the issues and a specific program of action. Simeon's
remarks were addressed to the academics who presented briefs or conducted
research for the Commission. Although he does not say so, his argument
might well be that only if such academics abandon the fundamentally
undialectical but common distinction between reformist and radical politics
can they expect to make a serious contribution to inquiries. The neo-classical
economists understood the point and, indeed, they did advocate a radical
restructuring of the economy and political life and yet also did manage to
provide a series of quite pragmatic recommendations.
Public advocates carry a different burden than do academics and
analysts. Their burden is based on the second contradiction of inquiries, the
ambiguous legal status. This burden is incurred not only because of the costs
of participation, which can be considerable, but because the interests that
public advocates represent are often diffuse ones. For example, in an inquiry
on daycare, it will be the interests of "all women with young children", rather
than the problems of specific individuals, that are represented. Unfortunately,
however, statements expressing a point of view or representing ill-defined
collectivities such as "all women with young children" are likely understood
as rhetorical, particularly when contrasted with evidence about specific rights,
legal obligations and economic consequences affecting individuals or companies. The legal substructure of inquiries tends to turn all participants into
"parties" in the narrow legalistic sense of the term if they wish to be effective.
There is a new kind of participant in many recent inquiries - the scientist. Increasingly, biologists, oceanographers, chemists and chemical
engineers, toxicologists, economists and anthropologists are called upon to
play a role in inquiries and to offer expert testimony on complex issues to
which science is presumed to have some special contribution to make. This is
now as true of the policy-oriented inquiries, such as the Berger and MacDo-
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nald Commissions, as it is of the risk assessments of potentially dangerous
products.
If inquiries are the free-wheeling irivestigations that they claim to be, we
might reasonably expect such scientists to provide a factual basis for a later
determination of policy recommendations. We might expect scientists to function as disinterested parties, paying little attention to legal issues that might
also arise. Indeed, innovative procedures are often intended to facilitate scientific discussion in inquiries, precisely so that scientists can provide an objective or factual view of the problems at hand. But the effect of the second
contradiction, the ambiguous legal status of inquiries, undermines the contributions that scientists can make and their abilities to provide a relatively
objective or factual view.
There are a number of reasons why this should be so. First, if some of the
participants in an inquiry act as if they were legally on trial, and others fail to
participate because they are not on trial, then the scientific data that participants will bring forward are those which fit within their legal strategies.
Companies will not discuss scientific literature that demonstrates conflicting
opinions about the risk of their chemicals, unless advised by their lawyers that
full disclosure is essential for a later defence. The limits of their scientific
contribution will be determined by their assessment of its impact on questions
about negligence and liability. The significance of this point can easily be
underestimated. Inquiries are more dependent upon the scientific expertise of
others than is often recognized. Most inquiries that rely extensively upon science conduct little of their own research, but instead simply review the studies
that have been submitted by others. The scientific studies being reviewed in
most inquiries are usually those conducted by the companies, whose scientific
contributions are influenced, at least indirectly, by the interests of those who
present them to the inquiry. In other words, although many inquiries pride
themselves on their handling of science, their scientific assessment is often
short-changed by the source of their data.
Second, scientists often find themselves subject to cross-examination in
an inquiry. Believing that inquiries differ from courts and that an adequate science incorporates recognition of its uncertainties, they fare poorly. The reason
is that a skillful lawyer can undermine the credibility of a scientific report
simply by forcing the scientist who produced it to confess to the areas of
uncertainty in his or her research or conclusions. "You don't really know", the
lawyer will ask, "that construction of the pipeline will diminish the caribou
herds?" or "that the high incidence of birth abnormalities near the canal is the
result of chemical exposure?" By emphasizing the methodological limitations
of particular studies and pointing out the inconclusiveness of science, a
lawyer can raise doubts about relying upon any scientific conclusion. Many
scientists find debate within inquiries to be antithetical to their understanding
of good scientific practice and are reluctant to participate as a result.
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Third, inquiries, like courts, require scientists to reach conclusions that
are useful for legal and regulatory purposes. Some types of science are more
likely to produce conclusive information than others and, thus, in inquiries,
some kinds of science have more usefulness than others. A carefully
controlled laboratory study is not different from a sophisticated econometric
model in this regard. In both cases, the high degrees of certainty that are
required to support legal arguments can be expressed about the conclusions
from such studies because the "environment" and variables within them can
be carefully controlled. Much less scientific certainty can be expressed in relation to problems such as the effect of violence on television or of pursuing
particular economic policies. As a result, this type of scientific research is
perceived to be less scientific, less reliable and, in turn, less useful to
inquiries. Inquiries often rely upon toxicology, rather than ecology, or
econometrics, rather than economic history. Yet, in a genuinely free-wheeling
inquiry about policy issues, it is often sociologists, historians and ecologists
that have the most to offer, since these sciences take a much broader view of
the problems they address.
Fourth, the science in inquiries is seen to be value-free and neutral, as it
is in almost every other context, and inquiries rely upon scientists to conform
to the norms of the scientific community in this regard. This situation creates a
paradox for scientists as participants in inquiries, for a commitment to values
other than scientific ones can be both necessary for and counter-productive to
their credibility. Scientists are not often called to testify in inquiries unless
they are willing to be expert witnesses for one or other "side" in a debate.
Moreover, in order to withstand questioning from lawyers, scientists need to
conform to legal, not scientific, norms and conduct themselves as if they were
in a court, not a scientific debate. At the same time, however, scientists must
learn to avoid any references to information or opinions that would make their
contribution less than scientific in appearance. Indeed, scientists who openly
espouse advocate positions are compromised with respect to their credibility,
particularly in comparison with their more careful colleagues who provide no
indication of their views.
Finally, I have stressed that inquiries also have a "private" component to
their deliberations, one that is characterized by time-pressure, the presence of
the government as a "silent partner" and intense negotiation. I made the point,
and it should be reiterated here in the discussion of science in inquiries, that
those engaged in the negotiations - the inquiry commissioners and staff tended to become disassociated from the particular interests or concerns that
they originally felt and that these individuals lacked any means of being
accountable for the "trade-offs" they negotiated. I want to extend the point
here.
Scientists who are commissioners or inquiry staff also become disassociated from their academic or disciplinary communities and from the process
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of scientific debate. They no longer represent their own research, but are
called on to represent the field of expertise or science as a whole. As such,
they are no longer in a position to discuss the various complexities of specific
research studies, to provide a rounded picture of the academic debate or
explain the schools of thought within it. They can provide no more than a
passing glimpse of the issues in conflict within their particular disciplines.
Moreover, because they are cast in the position of negotiators, they too
draw out of the raw material the particular phrases or conclusions that are
useful in a heated debate to support particular rhetorical positions. Were this
situation simply the give-and-take of political debate, then the use of facts of
rhetorical devices would be common and acceptable. In the context of dealing
with scientific or factual materials, such an approach distorts the fact-finding
enterprise by eliminating both contextual factors from the research and uncertainties and conflict within science from the discussion.
In other words, it is difficult for even the most dedicated inquiries to
maintain a commitment to their scientific objectives during the private comporient of the inquiry process when recommendations are being negQtiated.
The ambiguous legal status of inquiries hampers their efforts because it
influences the nature and the kind of contribution that scientists will make and
because it renders some of the most relevant scientific work less useful than it
otherwise should be. It also hampers their efforts because lawyers often taken
advantage of the opportunity to impune science or fashion it to their purposes,
which they can easily do because of the inherent uncertainty of most properly
conducted scientific research. As a result, the science of the inquiry process if
often less scientific than the inquiries themselves would wish and the factfinding component is often short-changed by the pressure to produce acceptable recommendations.
5.

CONCLUSION

The two contradictions in the inquiry process undermine both science
and advocacy in inquiries. The result is that most inquiries do not have participation from all the possible advocates and that scientific inquiries are seldom
as scientific in practice as their proponents claim. It is not uncommon foinquiries to attract participation only from the corporate groups, formal lobby
groups and government officials. Nor is it uncommon for people who are unable to deal with the simultaneously radical and reformist nature of inquiries
to become cynical about them. Inasmuch as these things happen, the conventional wisdom about inquiries - that they are used to delay, obfuscate and
"take the heat off government" - becomes true and their potential to define
important public issues, to incorporate scientific inforniation in the public debate and to put "the state on trial" is wasted.

